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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
in a second letter, that the grant was conditioned upon its execution of
the release as drawn.
The instant proceeding, commenced within four months after
receipt of the second letter but more than four months after receipt of
the first, was brought to compel the respondent to deliver the grant
without the covenant. However, the action was dismissed because it
had not been timely brought pursuant to CPLR 217, and the appellate
division unanimously affirmed.' 3
The Court of Appeals, reversing, held that the second letter, rather
than the first, constituted the final and binding determination con-
templated by CPLR 217 since its receipt was the first occasion upon
which the conditional nature of the covenant was conveyed to peti-
tioner. Moreover, the Court declared that in dealing with such a
dilatory defense courts should resolve any ambiguity against the public
body responsible for it. In this manner questionable cases may be
determined on their merits and parties will not be denied a day in
court. This conclusion is in accord with standards of fairness and due
process. When a petitioner has only four months within which to act,
he should not be required to guess as to when a determination of an
administrative body may have become final and binding.
ARTICLE 3- JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE OF COURT
CPLR 302(a): Third department refuses to extend long-arm statute in
matrimonial action.
It has been held that the execution of a separation agreement in
New York is not a "transaction of business" for the jurisdictional pur-
poses of CPLR 302(a)(1), since such an act is not "commercial" in
nature.14 This holding apparently enjoys continued vitality in New
York' 15 even though some decisions have seriously undermined it6 and
even though it has been criticized by notable authority.17
13 29 App. Div. 2d 16, 284 N.Y.S.2d 900 (3d Dep't 1967).
14 Willis v. Willis, 42 Misc. 2d 473, 248 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1964). See
The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 642, 646 (1967).
15 See Whitaker v. Whitaker, 56 Misc. 2d 625, 289 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. Ulster
County 1968) (dictum).
16 E.g., Van Wagenberg v. Van Wagenberg, 241 Md. 154, 215 A.2d 812, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 833 (1966) (New York judgment jurisdictionally based upon separation agree-
ment given full faith and credit); Kochenthal v. Kochenthal, 52 Misc. 2d 437, 275 N.Y.S.2d
951 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966); Raschitore v. Fountain, 52 Misc. 2d 402, 275 N.Y.S.2d
709 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1966) (dictum); Todd v. Todd, 51 Misc. 2d 94, 272 N.Y.S.2d
455 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966) (dictum). See The Quarterly Survey of New York Prac-
tice, 43 ST. JohN'S L. REv. 302, 309 (1968); The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 128, 132 (1967).
17 Professor McLaughlin sees no reason why the execution of a separation agreement
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The question still remains, however, whether, in the absence of
this tenuous jurisdictional predicate, jurisdiction can be obtained over
a spouse who is a non-domiciliary merely because the marriage occurred
in New York and the parties thereafter resided in the state. In Venizelos
v. Venizelos,'8 a separation action, the Appellate Division, Second De-
partment, in an alternate holding, 9 suggested that jurisdiction could
indeed be acquired over an absent spouse under such circumstances
because of both the nature of the contacts with the state and the in-
terests of the state in the litigation. But, in Whitaker v. Whitaker2 0 the
third department recently rejected this view.
In Whitaker, the plaintiff-wife sought temporary and permanent
alimony in a separation action. The parties had been married in New
York in 1961, and, after encountering marital difficulties in 1967, the
defendant-husband established a domicile in Florida, where he subse-
quently obtained a divorce. The husband was personally served in
Florida, and the wife contended that the New York court thereby
acquired jurisdiction over him. The court squarely rejected this con-
tention.21
The facts in Whitaker differ only slightly from the facts in Veni-
zelos, the marital domicile in the latter case being maintained in New
York for nine years instead of six. However, it would not appear that
the different result in Venizelos was prompted by the slightly longer
period of domicile; assuming that it was not, it is submitted that
Whitaker reaches the more sound conclusion.
Although expansion of our long-arm statute is welcome when it is
justified, violence is done to both its letter and spirit when the act of
marriage is viewed as either the transaction of business or a tortious act,
notwithstanding the opinion of the spouse seeking to obtain jurisdic-
tion.
Moreover, such a major extension of the long-arm statute would
be best accomplished by the legislature. However, until such action is
forthcoming, authoritative decisions from the Court of Appeals regard-
ing both this question and the nature of separation agreements are
warranted.
is not the transaction of business. 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 302, supp. commentary 106, 107
(1968).
Is 30 App. Div. 2d 856, 293 N.Y.S.2d 20 (2d Dep't 1968).
19 The defendant in Venizelos was found to have waived objection to personal juris-
diction. See The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 498, 503
(1969).
20 32 App. Div. 2d 595, 299 N.YS.2d 482 (3d Dep't 1969), af'g 56 Misc. 2d 625, 289
N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1968). See The Quarterly Survey of New York
Practice, 43 ST. JOHN's L. RlV. 302, 309 (1968).
2132 App. Div. 2d at 595, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 483:
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